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THE INJUNCTION BOND IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LITIGATION: THE NEED
FOR REFORM
Paul David Marotta*
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to advances in technology, temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions have gained the status of a judgment
after trial. Rapidly advancing technology frequently results in rela-
tively short periods available for commercial exploitation. It is true
that systems comparable with the original IBM personal computer
introduced six years ago remain available today.1 However, it is
more frequently true that many high technology products and
companies come and go in short order.2
Small delays in marketing or selling a product are potentially
devastating to the high technology company, and the issuance of an
injunction can be fatal. Similarly, when a company is unable to
obtain an injunction, aggressive marketing by a competitor can de-
stroy the market for the product in question, even when the com-
petitor's product is infringing.' As the available period for
commercial exploitation of a product decreases, the value of each
unit of time required for exploitation of a product increases.4
The cost of improperly granting or wrongfully denying an in-
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1. The IBM personal computer was first introduced in 1980. It contained 16,000 bytes
of random access memory and used an Intel 8088 microprocessor.
2. Such as the meteoric rise and fall of Osborn Computer Company and Morrow De-
signs, and the rise, fall, and rebirth of Atari.
3. One limitation in writing a paper with a subject of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions is that usually the former, and often the latter, are not subject to
appeal or the subject of an appeal or writ and therefore are not the subject of an appellate
opinion.
4. Obviously, if a product can command a market of $100,000 due to a unique tech-
nology of limited duration, the market should be exploited within the relevant time limita-
tion. As exploitation is delayed, the value of that exploitation disappears altogether due to
specific technology rather than merely suffering decrease due to the time value of money.
Therefore, during five months, the market may be worth $20,000 per month, while over 10
months, the market would only be worth $50,000 due to sales of $10,000 per month for five
months and no sales in the last five months because of the introduction of superior
technology.
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junction increases due to the high stakes frequently involved in
high technology injunctions.5 The injunction bond in particular
deserves scrutiny as it is frequently the sole remedy for a wrongfully
enjoined party.6
Injunction bonds were historically seen as useful and necessary
in order to protect an enjoined defendant.7 Nonetheless, the proce-
dure and basis for the setting of an injunction bond becomes of pri-
mary importance when that bond does not merely maintain the
status quo of litigation,' but hinders or allows advancement of a
new technology.9
There is an argument that if a new technology is merely an
infringement of a patent, copyright, or misappropriation of trade
secrets of another company, commercial exploitation of the infring-
ing technology should be stopped.10 This is clearly the case when a
trial has been held and a permanent injunction has been granted.11
Absent appeal,12 a bond is not required for a permanent injunc-
tion. 13 However, current law frequently provides a haphazard stan-
5. As mentioned previously, when time is of the essence, an injunction possibly takes
on greater significance than the discount rate alone. The reason for this increased significance
in cases involving advancing technology is the increased potential for obsolescence over time.
6. Jamaica Lodge 2188 of the Brotherhood of R and S Clerks v. Railing Express
Agency, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 253, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides in part that a bond is to be "for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
8. Arkansas-Best Freight System v. U. S., 350 F. Supp. 539, 542 (W.D.Ark. 1972).
9. Unfortunately, the "status quo" in a case involving high technology is that of con-
stant technological change, not stagnation. The test itself of whether an injunction maintains
the status quo should be subjected to scrutiny. In a rapidly changing industry, a product
could be under development one week and marketed commercially the next. The date on
which an injunction is sought could therefore be either fortuitous or devastating to the subject
of the injunction. If sales are ongoing, that would be the status quo, but if sales had not yet
begun, that would be the status quo.
10. Plumbers Local No. 519 v. Construction Industries Stab. Comm., 350 F. Supp. 6, 9
(S.D. Fla. 1972) (where the purpose of an injunction is not to maintain the status quo it must
appear that injury is imminent).
11. Likelihood of success on the merits is one element considered by a court in weighing
the propriety of a preliminary injunction. See Beer Mart, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 633 F.
Supp. 1089, 1104 (N.D. Ind. 1986). When a permanent injunction is granted, of course,
success on the merits is assured, absent appeal. Permanent injunctions are typically only
granted after full trial on the merits. See Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092, 1096-97
(5th Cir. 1985).
12. Both preliminary and permanant injunctions are appealable. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1); Overton v. City of Austin, 748 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1984).
13. If there is an appeal, an appeal bond is likely to be required. See generally, Henry v.
First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied. 601
F.2d 586, and First National Bank of Clarksdale v. Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc., cert.
den. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
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dard for the setting of an injunction bond. 4
Even when there is a strong case for an injunction, 15 a com-
pany winning an injunction is frequently unable to obtain sufficient
collateral to post the bond. Due to the practical requirement of full
collateralization of an injunction bond,16 a company winning an in-
junction is frequently unable to find a surety or post sufficient col-
lateral.17 Thus, the infringing technology is allowed to continue.
However, the argument exists that if the bond requirement is high,
it is due to a judicial finding that the potential damage to the en-
joined party is great. Sometimes, the plaintiff involved does not
choose to preceed to trial because the window of oppc-tunity for
the market concerned has closed, and the infringing product has
done sufficient damage to the market so as to make an injunction an
inadequate remedy.' 8
This article will first explore the standards and practical appli-
cation of several state and federal laws regarding the necessity and
amount of injunction bonds. Following this examination of current
law, the article will make suggestions for improvement on the stan-
dards with particular emphasis on high technology and intellectual
property litigation. The purpose of this article is to open the debate.
II. INJUNCTIONS AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) provide for
14. This is apparent from a review of cases in which the so-called "injunction bond
rule," has served to deny a wrongfully enjoined party from collecting damages equal to the
full consequences of the injunction. See, eg., Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc.,
561 F.2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1977) (claim of substantial damage by enjoined party limited to
$7500 amount of bond).
15. The predominant test for an injunction is that an injunction is proper if the appli-
cant can show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
injury, or the existence of serious questions going to the merits, and the balance of hardships
weighing in the applicants favor. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intern., Inc., 725 F.2d
521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984).
16. It is true, of course, that a company could still proceed with a trial for damages and
restitution, but, if the remedy at law is truly inadequate, a plaintiff may very well find a
judgment in damages does not provide a remedy. This is frequently the case when the market
for a brand new product is damaged by an infringing product. Several theories provide that
for new products or new companies, prospective profits are too speculative. See, e.g., Deau-
ville Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985); Contra, Rogerson
Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1494 (9th Cir. 1986).
17. This may particularly be true for a company which requires several rounds of fi-
nancing for ongoing research and development. If research contracts are prepaid, a start-up
may be research-rich, but cash poor.
18. An injunction is of no assistance in punishing for past actions. See Bowles v. Weiss,
66 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
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both temporary restraining orders 19 and preliminary injunctions.2"
Temporary restraining orders may be granted without notice to the
enjoined party, if it appears that immediate and irreparable injury
will result before the adverse party can be heard, and the applicant's
attorney certifies to the court what steps were made to give notice.21
Temporary restraining orders cannot exceed ten days, and the en-
joined party may move for dissolution or modification of the injunc-
tion on two days notice.22
In contrast, preliminary injunctions cannot be issued without
notice, and may be consolidated with a trial on the merits.23 Both
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders cannot be
issued unless the applicant relinquishes security to the court.24 The
security can be a sum which the court deems proper. This may
include the payment of costs and damages incurred or suffered by a
wrongfully enjoined party.25
Although F.R.C.P. 65(a) and F.R.C.P. 65(b) make sharp dis-
tinctions between restraining orders and injunctions, the substance
of the proceeding and the amount of notice given are more impor-
tant than the proceeding's characterization.26
III. INJUNCTION BOND LAW
Injunction applicants have shown atypical creativity in avoid-
ing the bond requirement. One plaintiff stated in a draft injunction
that the bond was excused for "good cause shown," although no
cause was specified,27 while another plaintiff attempted to act as its
own surety.28
Injunctions are designed as provisional remedies,29 and are pri-
marily used to preserve the status quo of litigation pending trial.30
They do not involve an adjudication of the ultimate rights of the
parties.31  Rather, injunctions are designed to prevent future
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
22. Id.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
,24. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
25. Id.
26. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1958).
27. Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 183 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. Ct. App. 1962).
28. Jenswold v. Peterson, 108 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Iowa 1961).
29. 1 KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES, §§ 14.01-14.02 (1986).
30. Co~lum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); American Hosp. Assoc. v.
Harris, 625 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1980).
31. University of Texas v. Cameniscb, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
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wrongs, not punish past acts.3 2
Injunctions are typically statutory animals, 3 although judicial
interpretation of injunction statutes has not been consistently strict
in following the relevant statutes.34 Consequently, statutes are the
place to start when examining injunction provisions, and are likely
to be the focal point when suggesting reforms.35
A. The Federal Statutory Regime
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65(c) provides that an
injunction shall not issue, "except upon the giving of security by the
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper. ' ' 36 Rule 65(c) is
substantially the same as former 28 U.S.C. § 302.31 F.R.C.P. 65.1
provides that a surety on an injunction bond submits himself or her-
self to the jurisdiction of the court for any issue affecting the
surety's liability on the bond.38
Some federal statutes specifically allow injunction without
bond,39 and others are silent as to whether or not a bond or under-
taking is required.' Of course, a great portion of high technology
litigation involves questions of patent and copyright infringement,
federal unfair competition, or trademark infringement. The provi-
32. United States v. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 627 0953); Taylor v. Gilmartin, 434 F.
Supp. 909, 910-911 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
33. The author was unable to find any jurisdiction of the United States which did not
have a statute dealing with injunctions generally. Many jurisdictions have injunction provi-
sions dealing with special situations such as family law or trade secrets as well. The most
consistent special application injunction provisions concerned agricultural products, and such
provisions typically waive the bond requirement.
34. See, eg., Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964)
(holding that bond not required in absence of proof of likelihood of injury); cf. Pioebe Mines
Counsel. Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965).
35. See supra, note 33.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides in full that "[n]o restraining order or preliminary
injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the
court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suf-
fered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such
security shall be required of the United States or of an officer or agency thereof. The provi-
sions of FED. R. CIv. P. 65.1 apply to a surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule."
37. 28 U.S.C. § 381 (1940) was repealed by the JUDICIAL CODE REVISION ACT of
1948. H.R. No. 308; H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.1 provides in relevant part that "[w]henever these rules require
or permit the giving of security by a party ... each surety submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any
papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertaking may be served."
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(b), which expressly allows injunction without bond for vio-
lation of federal securities laws.
40. See, e.g.. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) which provides in part that "[t]he several courts ...
shall have power to grant injunctions according to the principles of equity and upon such
terms as the court may deem reasonable."
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sions for injunctive relief under the Copyright Act4" contain similar
language to the provision for injunctive relief contained in the Lan-
ham Act.42
Generally, the provisions of § 502 of the Copyright Act and
§ 1116(a) of the Lanham Act state that an injunction may be
granted, "on such terms as [the court] may deem reasonable." The
"may deem reasonable" standard has not provided great direction
to the federal courts and has been interpreted to both require, and
to not require, an injunction bond.4"
The court is given similar discretion in patent infringement
cases.' One difference in patent infringement cases is that bonds
will sometimes be required from defendants as an alternative to an
injunction. Nonetheless, where there is a question as to a plain-
tiff's claims, a bond will be required to make a wrongfully enjoined
defendant whole.46 In any case, great discretion is allowed.47
In general, federal statutes provide little direction in assessing
the need for, or amount of, an injunction bond. The direction that
is provided frequently amounts to nothing more than carte blanche
judicial discretion. 8 Interpretation of these provisions frequently
results in the lack of a usable standard for the practitioner.
Even F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c), the general federal injunction bond
provision, is unclear. F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c) appears to set the stan-
dard that the injunction bond shall equal "such costs and damages
as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
41. See generally, 17 U.S.C. § 502.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) provides in full that, "[a]ny court having jurisdiction of a civil
action under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant tempo-
rary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain
infringement of a copyright."
43. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1922) (finding that a $250
bond was inadequate and should be increased to $5,000 when defendant had printed $15,000
worth of allegedly infringing books) Cf Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minnesota,
Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 304 (D. Minn. 1980) (holding that no bond was required where there
was no showing of injury to the enjoined company).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 283 provides in full that, "[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of
cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable."
45. See, e.g., Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Burton Stock Car Co., 77 F. 301 (Ist Cir.
1896).
46, Toley Furniture Co. v. Colby, 35 F. 592, 594 (N.D. I11. 1888).
47. Van Hook v. Wood, 28 F. Cas. 1003, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1845).
48. Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S.A. 569 F. Supp. 300 (5th Cir. 1978)
(trial court may elect no security at all); cf Aluminum Workers, Intern. Union AFL-CIO
Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982) (court's
discretion constrained by statutory language).
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been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." However, in the same
breath, F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c) provides that the amount of the injunc-
tion is in the court's discretion. 9 When read together, the provi-
sions seem to do away with an objective standard, and gives the
court sole discretion to set the bond at whatever amount the court
deems proper.
Despite the apparent mandatory nature of the provision, courts
have held that it may properly be in the discretion of the court not
to require bond." The comma after the word "proper" could con-
ceivably be removed from F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c) without practical
change, since the limiting phrase, following the comma, has been all
but ignored by some federal courts when discussing the propriety or
size of injunction bonds.
B. State Statutory Regimes
State statutes frequently mirror federal law,51 although many
state courts seem to read their respective injunction bond guidelines
much more strictly than federal courts.
1. California
California provides a bit more guidance to courts faced with
injunction bond issues. In California, the undertaking must be
ordered
to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined,
such damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, as the
party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally
decides the applicant was not entitled to the injunction."
Therefore, California does not allow the court open discretion in
setting the amount of an injunction undertaking. Contrary to other
states' statutes, the California statute does not provide that the un-
dertaking should be of an amount which "the court deems
proper."
5 3
In fact, in 1982, California passed a general bond and undertak-
ing law.5 4 Although the statutory scheme does not give significant
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides that the bond shall be, "in such sum as the court
deems proper."
50. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
51. In fact, several states such as Massachusetts and Texas seem to have adopted the
federal provisions.
52. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 529(a).
53. Id.; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
54. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 995.010 - 996.510.
1988]
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direction to a court in originally placing a bond, the law does pro-
vide a procedure with which to deal with insufficient and excessive
bonds." The beneficiary of a given bond may object to the bond on
the grounds that the sureties are insufficient, the amount of the
bond is insufficient, or the bond, "from any other cause," is
insufficient.16
The court generally requires an objection to be made by no-
ticed motion specifying the precise grounds for the objection. The
objection must be made within ten days after service of copy of the
bond on the beneficiary. 7 If the grounds for the objection include a
claim that the bond is insufficient, the motion must state the reason
for the insufficiency. If the motion is not brought within the re-
quired time, any objections are deemed waived unless good cause or
changed circumstances may be shown. 9
If, after a hearing, a court determines that a bond is insuffi-
cient, the court must specify in what respect the bond is insufficient
and order that a bond with sufficient sureties and in a sufficient
amount be given within five days.60 A bond in effect at a hearing at
which the bond is determined insufficient remains in effect until
either sufficient sureties are provided or the time in which to give
sufficient sureties expires.61
A motion claiming that a bond is insufficient must be sup-
ported by affidavit,62 and is heard in the same manner as an objec-
tion to the bond.63 California also provides for a motion for
determination that the amount of the bond is excessive and an order
that the amount be reduced to "an amount that in the discretion of
the court or officer appears proper under the circumstances."64 Af-
ter a motion is made that the bond is excessive, the amount of the
bond is left to the discretion of the court.
This is obviously a change from the standard to be used in orig-
inally setting the bond.6 The procedure for reducing the amount of
a bond is specifically made subject to limitations in the statute
55. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 995.920 - 996.010.
56. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 995.920.
57. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 995.930 (Deering Supp. 1987).
58. Id., § 995.930(a).
59. Id., § 995.930(c).
60. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 995.960(b) (Deering Supp. 1987).
61. Id.. § 995.960(b)(2).
62. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.010 (Deering Supp. 1987).
63. Id., § 996.010(b).
64. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.030(a) (Deering Supp. 1987).
65. Id.
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under which a bond is ordered.66 This is in recognition that the
standards for setting the amount of the bond vary as to the Civil
Procedure Code section under which the bond is originally
required.67
Supporting affidavits are required6" and the procedure is the
same as that for determination that a bond is insufficient.69 If the
bond is found to be excessive, the principal may give a new bond for
the reduced amount. The same sureties may be involved as with the
original bond, and no time limit is given for reduction of the bond.70
Presumably, the party applying for reduction of an excessive bond
should obtain reduction in the amount of the bond as soon as
possible.
The California provisions regarding the amount of sureties are
unclear as to whether motions may be made for reducing the
amount of an excessive bond prior to establishment of the liability
of a surety on the amount originally ordered by the court. The pro-
visions seem to indicate that a bond must be in effect prior to a
motion for reduction in the amount of an excessive bond. Thus, the
provision provides little help to the injunction applicant who is un-
able to meet the amount of a bond required by the court. The appli-
cant may then be limited to a motion for rehearing, and must
attempt to present new evidence showing why the amount of the
injunction bond originally ordered was excessive.
Although the California procedure for modification of injunc-
tion bonds provides some cursory relief to a plaintiff claiming a
bond is excessive, or a defendant claiming a bond is insufficient, the
standard for originally setting a bond gives no more instruction to
the bench than F.R.C.P. 65(c).
2. Georgia
The Georgia statute provides that security is, "a prerequisite to
the issuance of a restraining order or an interlocutory injunction,"
but only if the court so requires and only in such sum as the court
deems proper.71 Despite the "prerequisite," a bond is not required
66. See supra note 63.
67. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 995.020(a). Since § 995.020(a) states that the Bond or
Undertaking Law applies to any undertaking posted pursuant to any California statute, and
since the statutes requiring or allowing bonds are legion and diverse, the Bond and Undertak-
ing Law could not regulate the original basis for the bond.
68. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.030(b) (Deering Supp. 1987).
69. Id.
70. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.030(c) (Deering Supp. 1987).
71. GEORGIA CIVIL PROCEDURE AcT § 81A-165(c) provides that, "as a prerequisite to
1988]
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by this statute prior to issuance of an injunction. Nonetheless, the
Georgia Civil Practice Act does expressly allow advancement and
consolidation of a trial on the merits with the injunction hearing.72
Georgia provides separately for enjoining a trademark infringe-
ment.73 Possibly due to a heightened sense of potential damage by
such infringement, the legislature omitted the "prerequisite" lan-
guage, using a lesser standard "as may be [considered] by the court
just and reasonable."' 74 Additionally, the state seems to have dis-
pensed with the injunction bond rule, at least in cases for wrongful
seizure of allegedly counterfeit goods.75
3. Illinois
Illinois employs the broad judicial discretion standard,76 thus,
issuance of an injunction without a bond is discretionary.77 One
Illinois case put it succinctly when it stated that injunctions were
extraordinary remedies, and were even more extra-ordinary
when granted without bond.78
Nonetheless, Illinois allows a motion to dissolve injunctions at
any time79 and does add something to the debate, requiring that
when an injunction is dissolved, the court must, after application by
the enjoined party, enter judgment in favor of the enjoined party if
that party suffered damages. s0 However, Illinois case law has soft-
ened this remedy by requiring a prior adjudication of "wrongful"
entry of the injunction before recovery.8' The fact that the earlier
enjoined party has now prevailed does not seem to be satisfactory.
the issuance of a restraining order and an interlocutory injunction, the court may require the
giving of security by the applicant, in such sums as the court deems proper for the payment of
such cots and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been enjoined or restrained wrongfully."
72. GEORGIA CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 81A-165(a).
73. GA. CODE ANN., § 106-112(e) allows injunctions to restrain the manufacture, use,
display, or sale of any counterfeits or imitations of a trademark or service mark.
74. Id.
75. GA. CODE ANN. § 106-112(e).
76. ILL. REV. STAT., § 11-103. "The court in its discretion, may.. .require the appli-
cant to give bond in such sum, upon such condition and with such security as may be deemed
proper by the court."
77. East Side Health Dist. v. Village of Careyville, 38 Ill. App. 2d 438, 187 N.E.2d 534
(1963).
78. Sunset Hills Homeowners Ass'n. v. Karel, 39 Ill. App. 2d 477, 189 N.E.2d 41
(1963).
79. ILL. REV. STAT., § 11-108.
80. ILL. REV. STAT., § 11-110. The statute further provides that a failure to assess dam-
ages as required will not act to bar an action on the bond.
81. See Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co. v. Darwell Industries Inc., 69 Ill. Dec. 71, 94 Ill.2d
535, 497 N.E.2d 288 (1983).
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4. Louisiana
The Code Law82 of the state of Louisiana has one of the
strongest bond requirements. It provides that an injunction "shall
not issue unless the applicant furnishes security in the amount fixed
by the court, except where security is dispensed with by the law."83
The bond requirement is mandatory, though the amount of the re-
quired bond is discretionary. 4
5. Massachussetts
In Massachusetts, a state with a substantial high technology
industry, a restraining order or injunction cannot issue except upon
the giving of an undertaking, "in such sum as the court deems
proper."85 This is essentially the standard of the Federal Rules.
6. New York
New York is as strict as Louisiana, requiring that "prior to the
granting of a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff shall give an un-
dertaking in an amount to be fixed by the court."86 Security is al-
ways required for a preliminary injunction,87 although it is
discretionary in the case of a temporary restraining order.88 Of
course, as the length of pendency of an improper injunction de-
creases, so too does the potential for harm and therefore the neces-
sity for certainty of result. New York then contributes the idea that
the bonding requirement should be more strictly enforced for pre-
liminary injunctions than for temporary restraining orders.
7. Ohio
Ohio has a novel approach to the bond requirement, providing
that, even if an injunction is granted, "[n]o temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction is operative until the party ob-
82. Louisiana arguably bases its law on "Roman Law" or the Justinian Codes, rather
than on case law.
83. LA. CODE CIV. PROc., article 3610 (West 1981, 1987).
84. First Nat. Bank of Lawrence v. Batall, 411 So.2d 1193 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds 422 So.2d 1159 (1982); Lenfants Caterers, Inc. v. Firemans' Charitable and Benev.
Ass'n. of New Orleans, 386 So.2d 1053 (1980); Citizens, Electors & Taxpayers of
Tangipahoe Parish v. Layrisson, 419 So.2d 613 (1984) cert. den. 452 So.2d 170 (1984).
85. Mass. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
86. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R., 6312(b) (McKinney 1980, 1988).
87. See Cool Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Rogers, 509 N.Y.S.2d 180, 125 A.D.2d 758
(1986) (injunction should not have been granted without bond); City Store Gates Mfg. Corp
v. United States Steel Products, Inc. 433 N.Y.S.2d 876, 79 A.D.2d. 671 (1980) (court without
power to dispense with posting of bond).
88. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 6313(c) (McKINNEY 1980, 1988).
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taining it gives a bond . . . in an amount fixed by the court." 9
Though some cases have been true to the language of the statute,
which states that a person cannot be held in contempt for violation
of either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
unless such restraining order or injunction has been made operative
by the posting of a bond,9" others have not.9
8. Oregon
Oregon provides that "[n]o restraining order or preliminary in-
junction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the appli-
cant, in such amount as the court deems proper."92 Oregon
approaches the strict requirement of New York or Louisiana in
making the bond requirement mandatory, while allowing discretion
in the amount. In fact, Oregon appears to be a more conservative
jurisdiction than New York since the bond requirement is
mandatory for temporary restraining orders as well as preliminary
injunctions.
9. Texas
In Texas, an injunction without the requirement of a bond, or
posting of a bond is void ab initio.93 Cases suggest that if a bond is
not required, a plaintiff may be able to save an injunction by volun-
tarily posting a bond.94 It seems that, regardless of the amount of
the bond, if some bond is required the injunction will survive.95
The Texas injunction bond statute provides that the court shall
fix the amount of the security to be given by the injunction appli-
cant. The rule further provides that the applicant will abide by the
decision in the case, and will "pay all sums of money and costs that
may be adjudged against him if the restraining order or temporary
89. OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(c).
90. North Electric Co. v. United Steel Workers of America, 28 0. App. 2d 253, 277
N.E.2d 59 (1971).
91. Colquett v. Byrd, 59 0. Misc. 48, 392 N.E.2d 1328 (1979).
92. OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 82A(1)(a).
93. See Jernigan v. Jernigan, 467 S.W.2d 621 (1971); Boren v. Bank of the West, 535
S.W.2d 776 (1976); Young v. Gardner, 435 S.W.2d 192 (1968).
94. Jernigan and Boren, supra note 93, both suggest that failure by the court to require
a bond, or failure by an applicant to post a bond results in the injunction being void. None-
theless, the courts most likely meant that a bond had to be posted once required by the court,
and did not mean to imply that a plaintiff could voluntarily post a bond, though none had
been required. This could, of course, place the applicant in the unusual position of suggesting
that a bond be required when a defendant makes such a request.
95. See generally Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval County Ranch Co., Inc., 504 S.W.2d 923
(1973).
[Vol. 4
INJUNCTION BOND
injunction shall be dissolved in whole or in part." 9 6
Although the standard provided by statute seems to imply full
discretion, the applicant need be ready to pay only the amount
which would be proper if the restraining order were improperly
granted. Although this implies a similar two part standard as that
contained in the Federal Rules,9 7 the standard under which the
court labors grants significant discretion, thus amounting to little or
no standard at all.98
If the function of a bond "is to protect a defendant if it is sub-
sequently determined that a t.r.o. was improvidently issued to the
defendant's detriment," 99 then the standard used to set a bond un-
dertaking should consider the possible detriment suffered by the
defendant.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INJUNCTION BOND ISSUE
A. Injunction Without Bond
One proper reason to grant an injunction without the require-
ment of a bond is that the court granting the injunction is not lim-
ited to the general equitable powers of a federal court. For
example, a bankruptcy court may exercise power expressly confided
in it by the Bankruptcy Act."°° A federal court may examine the
purposes behind the bond requirement,"0 ' and therefore need not
follow a strict interpretation of the statute or defer to the wisdom of
Congress.
In fact, despite the apparently mandatory language of most in-
junction bond requirements, a court may dispense with such secur-
ity where there has been no proof of a likelihood of harm to the
party enjoined.1"2 Injunction bonds will also not be required when
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 684 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
97. FED. R. CIv. P. § 650).
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 684 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides only that "the court shall fix the
amount." This seems to be even less instruction to a court than the Federal standard ("as the
court deems proper") or the California standard (an amount equal to "such damage... as
the party may sustain by reason of the injunction"). The Federal standard invokes "propri-
ety" and the California standard actually sets an "objective" basis for the amount of the
undertaking; both of which are more instructive to the court than the Texas standard.
99. KNAPP, A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BUSINESS LITIGATION, § 14.04[2], 14-10
(1986).
100. Halpert v. Engine Air Service, Inc., 212 F.2d 860, 862-64 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. dis-
missed, 350 U.S. 801 (1956).
101. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212, 241 (8th Cir.
1970) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
102. International Control Corporation v. Vesco & Co., Inc. 490 F.2d 1334, 1356 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
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a preliminary injunction is issued to preserve a trial court's jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of an action, 10 3 or where a preliminary
injunction is issued to protect and enforce the orders of a court."°4
Other circumstances in which a bond is not required are le-
gion. Where the bond requirement stifles and strips a plaintiff's
right to judicial review, plaintiff need not post security.'05 Where
the defendant does not request a bond, no bond will be required.'0 6
Even after requesting a bond, the defendant still needs to prove
a likelihood of harm or a bond will not be required. 0 A bond will
not be necessary when a court is issuing an injunction to protect and
enforce its orders or preserve subject matter jurisdiction.'0 8 Finally,
injunctions may be issued without bond when plaintiff is unable fi-
nancially to post a bond.109
One common circumstance in which injunctions have been
granted without bond is where the applicant for the injunction is
indigent. 110 In some indigency cases, a court will find no bond re-
quirement exists by rationalizing that there will be no harm to the
enjoined party."'
Some courts still strictly interpret the bond requirement in
spite of the apparent penchant for liberality toward statutory provi-
sions. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has expressed a strong de-
sire for the requirement of a bond.' 12 This could be due to the
presence of the "law and economics" school in the Seventh Circuit.
Still, the haphazard application of rules regarding the grant of an
injunction without a bond is some argument, by itself, for reform.
B. Guidelines for Setting the Amount of Bond
The amount required for a given bond can be more troubling
than whether or not a bond will be required. If there is little or
insufficient evidence concerning the proper amount of security, it is
103. See infra note 101.
104. Id.
105. Williamsport v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 899, 903 (M.D. Pa. 1967), cert. aff'd,
392 U.S. 642 (1968).
106. U.S. v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
107. Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir. 1964).
108. Bivens v. Board of Public Education and Orphanage, 284 F. Supp. 888, 898 (M.D.
Ga. 1967).
109. Denny v. Health and Social Services Board, 285 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Wis.
1968).
110. J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 140 (M.D. Ga. 1976) rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 584 (1976).
111. Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
112. Reinders Bros. v. Rain Bird Easter Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 54 (7th Cir. 1980).
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improper for a court to arbitrarily set some figure. This is true even
though a court must still discharge its duty under injunction bond
statute requirements.
1 13
Some courts will require a bond even when a defendant has
shown that only negligible harm may result.1 4 Others will waive
the requirement as not providing meaningful relief.1 5
C. Modifying Injunctive Relief
While California has provided a statutory means for modifying
a bond, other courts accomplish the same ends judicially. Federal
District Courts always retain the power, after granting an injunc-
tion, to modify injunctive relief in light of changed circum-
stances. 
116
Similarly, a bond already posted may be either increased or
decreased due to changed circumstances. When it does not appear
that a defendant will be subjected to large costs, a bond may still be
increased due to attorneys fees and costs of appeal.1 17 A defendant
looking to increase a bond will need to meet the burden of proof
and act prior to dissolution of the injunction. 8 This later rule
could obviously damage the wrongfully enjoined defendant who de-
lays in requesting a higher amount of bond.
D. Strict Construction
In spite of the judicial inclination to sometimes treat lightly the
mandate of F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c), some courts read the statutes
strictly. Courts have opined that where no bond has been required,
as called for by F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c), an injunction must be re-
versed,119 dissolved, 20 and vacated.1 21
One court found that a lower court had violated F.R.C.P. 65(c)
by not requiring a bond when granting a preliminary injunction,
and therefore a wrongfully enjoined defendant could still recover
113. Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, 490 (N.D. N.Y. 1971).
114. Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273, 274 (2nd Cir. 1964).
115. See supra note 87.
116. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. Ringling Bros. - Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Acme Circus Operat-
ing Co., 216 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1961).
118. Carpenter & Hughes v. De Joseph, 217 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1961).
119. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964), cert den. 380
U.S. 956 (1965).
120. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.
1972).
121. Holohan v. Holohan, 8 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. N.Y. 1948).
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damages.122 Some courts have found that although the amount of a
bond is within judicial discretion, that discretion is constrained by
the statutory language. 123 Still, the great weight of precedent is in
favor of broad judicial discretion. 124
E. Who Can Demand Security
Generally, a bond is required for payment of damages to any
party found to have been wrongfully enjoined.125 This obviously
could cause problems in a class action involving a defendant class.
It follows that any party subject to the injunction should be
able to recover against the bond unless the injunction is wrongfully
granted. 126 However, this may not always be the case. Someone
not a party to the case, and only arguably restrained by the injunc-
tion, may not have standing to demand security. 12 7
By the express language of many statutes, including F.R.C.P.
65(c), only a "party" who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained may recover against the bond. Nonetheless this prob-
ably does not preclude any recovery by a non-party restrained as a
result of a wrongfully granted injunction. Additionally, harm to the
public in general is one issue which should be considered in making
the initial determination as to the propriety of the requested
injunction. 128
In one case, a New York court held that where a circus was an
indispensible party and might suffer substantial damage by an in-
junction, the circus was entitled to be protected by a bond. 129
F. Who Must Post Bond
The applicant for injunctive relief is generally required to post
122. Monroe Division, Litton Bus. Systems, Inc. v. DeBari, 562 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir.
1977).
123. Urbain v. Knapp Brothers Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
124. Aluminum Workers Intern. Union AFL-CIO Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated
Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 1982).
125. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. S.E.K. Construction Co., 436 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir.
1971).
126. Determination of the individuals and entities subject to the terms of an injunction
can be complex. By the express language of FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) an injunction restrains the
parties, their agents, and "those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order."
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Price Commission, 342 F. Supp 1311,
1312 (D.C. P.R. 1972).
128. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp 667,
676 (D.C. Ill. 1976).
129. McClosky v Long Island Hockey Club, Inc. 239 N.Y.S. 2d 40 (1963).
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the bond.13° This rule, however, is not universal. The difficulties
with policing the rule are obvious. If a patent holder is not in a
position to protect his or her patent and a prospective licensee funds
litigation, who must post the bond? The answer is that the patent
holder must post the bond, but a court is not going to inquire into
the source of funds.1 31
One court has noted that F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c) envisions that
the security is to be provided by the party who will be unjustly en-
riched if the court errs in issuing the injunction.1 32 And, of course,
the restrained party cannot be required to post the bond. 133
G. Judicial Discretion
An examination of the judicial treatment of the injunction
bonds requirements points out the inconsistent exercise of discre-
tion and arbitrary results that are legitimate concerns of the party
to an injunction hearing. Many courts have held that a bond is not
required in cases where a temporary injunction issues. 134 Other
courts have held that even though the statutes generally provide
that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue except
upon the giving of a security, the requirement of security in each
case actually rests in the discretion of the judge. 135 Despite the
seemingly mandatory language of the rule, courts have generally
decided that the security requirement is actually within the discre-
tion of the court.' 36
It is also possible that a substitution for a bond could be pro-
vided. For example, a court may waive the requirement of payment
of back salary as substitution for an injunction bond, even when the
retroactive reinstatement of certain employees is part of the action
sought by the injunction.137
130. Randolph v. Missouri-Kansas Texas R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 1007 (D.C. Mo. 1946).
131. In any case, there is a very good argument to be made that the patent holder is
"posting" the bond regardless of whether the collateral comes from earned surplus, debt, an
interested prospective licensee, or even a new issue of securities. The focus of the bond re-
quirement is protecting the defendant rather than ensuring singular payment by the plaintiff
if the injunction is improper.
132. Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478, (N.D. N.Y. 1971).
133. Bivins v. Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, 284 F. Supp.
888 (D.Ga. 1967).
134. Urbain v. Knapp Brothers Manufacturing Company, 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954),
cert. den., 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
135. Powelton Civic Home Owners Assoc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
136. Wisconsin Heritage, Inc. v. Harris, 476 F. Supp 300, 302 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
137. Hunter v. City of Ann Arbor, 325 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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Nonetheless, a court faced with an injunction bond issue
should entertain and expressly rule on the bond request. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court should grant the require-
ment for a bond. 138
Defendants in cases involving intellectual property are fre-
quently successful in a request for a bond, 139 as are defendants in-
volved in commercial disputes. 140 The amount of an injunction
bond is within the sound discretion of a court; as is the isssue of
whether or not a bond will be required. 4 ' However, the exercise of
such discretion is constrained by the statutory language which au-
thorizes the injunction and provides for the bond. t42
When it is apparent that the injunction will cause more dam-
age than originally thought, a court is authorized to order an in-
crease in the security.143  However, offsetting factors must be
considered because the estimated amount of damages must be in
terms of a net figure.1" Courts should take care in setting bond
amounts, since the specific issue of setting the amount of a bond is
typically not appealable.' 45
At least one standard utilized in determining whether or not an
injunction bond should be increased requires a showing of either a
"material change in conditions," or the development of "unusual
and unforeseen circumstances."' 146 Some cases have differentiated
between temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions,
holding that undertakings are unnecessary for the former, but re-
quired on the granting of the latter. 147
Of course, as with most anything, an injunction bond can be
waived by the enjoined party.148 A defendant is generally protected
from damage in the event that the plaintiff does not prevail to the
138. Reinders Brothers, Inc. v. Rain Bird Easter Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.
1980).
139. See generally, 2 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE MARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES, § 14.43, page 159 (4th ed. 1982).
140. See generally, International Manufacturing Company v. Landon, Inc. 327 F.2d 824
(9th Cir. 1964).
141. Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976).
142. System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp., 555 F.2d 1339 (3d
Cir. 1977).
143. Standard Forms Co. v. Nave, 422 F. Supp. 619 (Tenn. 1976).
144. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Price Comm., 342 F. Supp. 1308, 1310
(D.P.R. 1972).
145. Schultz v. Ingram, 248 S.E.2d 345, 351, 38 N.C. App. 422 (1978).
146. Insurance Financial Services, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance Company, Inc., 271
S.C. 289, 247 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1978).
147. Greenly v. Cooper, 77 Cal. App. 3d 382, 143 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1978).
148. Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
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extent of the amount of bond as required by the court. 149
Some courts do not allow either a temporary restraining order
or injunction absent the posting of a bond. Preliminary injunctions
granted under circumstances where a bond or security is statutorily
required are void where no bond is provided for.150 Further, courts
have opined that language stating, "no restraining order ... shall
issue except upon the giving of security," make the requirement
mandatory, not precatory 511 As late as 1914 the federal courts
were allowed to grant injunctions "with or without security, in the
discretion of the court or judge." '52
The language of the undertaking or security was formerly more
important than it is currently. For example, when a bond recited
that it had been given in consideration for an injunction, but the
injunction was issued and was served before the bond was given, the
sureties on the bond have been held not to be liable, though the
bond was given prior to any attempt to collect on the bond.1 53
Where an undertaking issues in order to protect defendants en-
joined by a city, those defendants had a cause of action against the
officers of the city because the officers' names appeared on the
bond. 154
Nonetheless, the idea that an injunction bond should secure all
of the rights and legal consequences resulting from an unsuccessful
prosecution of an injunction for the enjoined party has been recog-
nized for some time.1 55 Some courts have held that the language of
an injunction bond should be interpreted strictly. Others have
found that where a bond is made payable improperly to a sheriff
instead of the enjoined party, it is nevertheless sufficient to protect
the defendant in the event that the injunction is improperly
issued. 156
If an injunction bond is broader than that required by statute,
the entire bond is not vitiated.15 7 Rather, recovery cannot be had
on the bond for a breach which is not according to statute.15 8
149. American Television & Communications Corp. v. Manning, 651 P.2d 440, 446
(Colo. App. 1982).
150. In re Tamblyn, 298 Or. 620, 695 P.2d 902 (1985).
151. Id.
152. Carter v. Mulrein, 82 Cal. 167, 22 P. 1086 (1889).
153. Hawthorne v. McArthur, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 526 (1886).
154. Mahan v. Tydings, 49 Ky. 351 (1850).
155. Vicksburg & S. & T. R. Co. v. Barksdale, 15 La. Ann. 465 (1860).
156. Menken v. Frank, 57 Miss. 732 (1880).
157. Id.
158. See CLAYTON AcT, ch. 323, §§ 17-18, 38 Stat. 730, 737-38 (1917); cf FED. R. Civ.
P. 65(c).
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In appellate review of the amount of a bond posted, appeals
courts will use the "abuse of discretion" standard.159 Thus, if the
trial court has not clearly abused the discretion granted by the stat-
ute in the setting of a bond, the appellate court will not overturn the
lower court. This is apparently due to the great discretion given the
trial court under F.R.C.P. Rule 65(c). 160
H. Damages
There is an argument that the bond requirement should be
waived where the plaintiff can show financial responsibility. The
plaintiff will always be liable for a wrongful injunction, Whether or
not a bond is posted, or is sufficient. 6 ' This suggestion seems to
stem from the same school of thought as the idea of doing away
with the injunction bond rule altogether. A bond would not be a
limitation on a plaintiff's potential liability, but merely an assurance
of solvency.
Recoverable damages under an injunction bond are those
which arise from operation of the injunction itself.' 62 These dam-
ages generally do not include damages which are occasioned by
other aspects of the case independent of the injunction. 63
When an injunction is overbroad, damages may be recovered
on the bond as well as from the plaintiff, and return of the security
would be improper without allowing the defendant to proceed. 
164
IV. PERIPHERAL ISSUES
In addition to the direct effect of the initial determination of
the amount of an injunction bond, there are several peripheral is-
sues tied to the bond amount which need to be considered in draft-
ing a regime for injunction bonds. These peripheral issues follow.
A. The Injunction Bond Rule
Even though a judgment by an enjoined party on a bond shall
be in an amount determined by the court, 6 ' the aggregate liability
159. Monroe Div., Litton Business Sys. v. De Bari, 562 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1977);
Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964).
160. Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp., 528 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1976).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
162. Lever Bros. Co. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th
Cir. 1976).
163. Id. at 120.
164. Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Nationwide Charters and Conventions, Inc., 413 F.2d
335, 338 (1st Cir. 1969).
165. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.460(b).
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of a surety for all breaches of the condition of a bond is limited to
the amount of the bond. 166 This does not mean, however, that in
California there is any limitation of liability on the part of the
principal. 167
The injunction bond rule generally states that recovery for any
damages which might result from the improper issuance of an in-
junction is limited to the amount of a bond.168 In the absence of an
injunction bond, there may be no recovery even where a temporary
restraining order is granted without just cause. 169
The injunction bond rule raises the question of whether the
plaintiff should be granted any limitation on liability for a wrong-
fully issued injunction. At least one commentator feels that a bond
should always be required, and that the amount of the bond should
be an absolute limit on the plaintiff's liability. 170 Nonetheless, there
is no reason why a plaintiff's liability for seeking and obtaining an
illegal injunction should be limited.
The hesitancy to do away with the injunction bond rule is
probably grounded in the feeling that the court has at least a small
part to play in granting the injunction. Although recovery for dam-
ages caused by a wrongfully issued injunction could be seen as simi-
lar to those recoverable for abuse of process, one must resolve the
conflict of abuse of process damages being granted when judicial
process took part in the purported abuse. Because courts cannot be
made liable, the plaintiff will be partially absolved. However, elimi-
nation of the injunction bond, and therefore, a plaintiff's limited
liability, would surely impose some restraint on overly zealous
plaintiffs applying for sweeping injunctions.
The bond requirement could still address the practical require-
ment of a liquid plaintiff/applicant, but need not form either a limi-
tation on the damages recoverable by the defendant, or a limitation
on the liability of the plaintiff. Appeal bonds do not present a limit
on recovery for a lost appeal, even though there is a liquidated
claim on which the bond is based.171 Rather, the underlying judg-
166. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.470(a).
167. Id.
168. Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of Am., 553 F.2d 793, 800
(2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
169. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction F. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824, 877
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
170. Note, Recoveryfor Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV.
L. REV. 828 (1986).
171. See, e.g., Palm Beach Heights Dev. & Sales Corp. v. Decillis, 385 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.
App. 1980).
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ment on which the appeal bond is based presents the limit on the
appellant's potential liability.
Similarly, an injunction applicant should be liable for all dam-
ages proximately caused by a wrongful injunction, and the bond
requirement should be used to ensure liquidity in the event of judg-
ment. Certainly in California, bonds must contain a statement that
the sureties are jointly and severally liable on the obligations.' 72
Additionally, a beneficiary may generally enforce the liability on a
bond against both the principal and the sureties. 173
The kinds of damages which may be recovered from the surety
are quite broad.174 Nonetheless, damages which have been occa-
sioned by the underlying litigation, independent of the injunction
alone, are not recoverable from a surety. 171 In general, the damages
recoverable under an injunction bond are for all losses proximately
resulting from the injunction. 176 The factors to be considered in
determining the loss to the enjoined party depend on the circum-
stances of the particular case. Generally, equitable principles
should be applied, and just and reasonable compensation should be
granted to the enjoined party for the losses sustained. 177
Recoverable damages include such things as discovery ex-
penses incurred in enforcing the injunction bond,178 actual and con-
sequential damages, 179 depreciation of plant and equipment,180
interest,181 taxes, 18 2 and costs 183 Items not recoverable on an in-
junction bond include attorney's fees 18 4 and nominal damages if no
damages can be proved.' 5
172. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 995.320(a)(1) (Deering 1980 & Supp. 1987).
173. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 996.410(a).
174. Lever Bros. Co. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F,2d 115 (4th Cir.
1976).
175. Id. at 120.
176. Surety Savings & Loan Ass'n v. National Auto & Casualty Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 3d
752, 757, 87 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1970).
177. Id.
178. Heiser v. Woodruff, 128 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1942).
179. Silvers v. TTC Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1973), on remand, 395 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
180. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction F. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824, 879
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
181. Id. at 880.
182. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Helvering, 112 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
183. Handy v. Samaha, 117 Cal. App. 286, 3 P.2d 602 (1931).
184. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., Inc. v. S.E.F. Constr. Co., 436 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1971).
185. Bustamante v. Stewart, 55 Cal. 115 (1880).
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B. Stay on Appeal
A preliminary injunction is appealable as an interlocutory or-
der. 86 As such, it may be stayed pending appeal. 187 Appeals must
generally be taken to the appellate courts and the Supreme Court
will only stay injunction pending appeal in unusual circum-
stances. 188 The grant of a preliminary injunction must be affirmed
unless there was an abuse of discretion.189
C. Liability of Surety
Even after release of the security there may still be damages
under the bond.1 9° The liability of the surety will attach upon the
event of a decree dismissing the injunction,1 9 ' voluntary dismissal of
the injunction by the plaintiff without the consent of the defend-
ant,192 or where the injunction was issued as a result of incomplete
knowledge by the court. ' 93
The liability of a surety may be reduced by settlement of the
parties' 94 and some cases have denied surety liability where there
was not a final judgment in favor of the party enjoined.'95
V. INJUNCTION BONDS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY
Injunctions will always cause some damage to the enjoined
party. By definition, injunctions are a prohibition on otherwise law-
ful activity. The peculiar result of enjoining companies engaged in
high technology enterprises is due to the relatively quick degree of
186. Maine v. Fri, 483 F.2d 439, 440 (Ist Cir. 1973).
187. This could produce the rather odd situation of the applicant posting an injunction
bond and the enjoined party posting an appeal bond. Courts have typically handled this by
balancing anew the likelihood of success and weighing the outcome. See, Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 448 U.S. 1301 (1980) (stay denied and injunction entered), reh'g
denied. 448 U.S. 909 (1980); Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976).
188. Northern California Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal, 469 U.S. 1205, 105 S.Ct.
459, 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1984).
189. Apple Computer Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.
1984). The author was unable to find any case involving appeal of the bond issue above. This
is likely due to the availability of continuous review of the bond amount at the trial level.
190. Atomic Oil Co. v. Bandahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397
U.S. 1063 (1970).
191. Id.
192. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212, 243 (8th Cir.
1970) cert. den., 402 U.S. 999, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1971).
193. Traveler's Mutual Casualty Co. of Des Moines v. Skeer, 24 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo.
1938) appeal dismissed, 106 F.2d 1017, 1018 (1939).
194. Future Fashions v. American Surety Co. of New York, 58 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944).
195. American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 594 (3rd Cir. 1971).
42 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
change those industries experience. While it is true that other mar-
kets could involve the same problems of high technology industries,
the high level of research and development expenditures make high-
tech particularly valuable. "Fad" consumer products, for example,
experience very short windows of opportunity and then are fre-
quently never heard from again. Pet rocks are one example and
trivia games are potentially another.
The need for quick market access in high technology is due to
the rapidity of advancements rather than a need to capture fleeting
consumer attention. Due to the short periods available for com-
mercial exploitation, delaying introduction of a product through in-
junction could be attractive to competitors.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The lack of uniformity among the state statutes points out the
range of policies available for implementation in drafting injunction
bond requirements. An example of the reforms which are possible
include ordering expedited discovery or consolidation with trial on
the merits in an effort to increase the certainty of the propriety of
injunctive relief; allowing oral argument or juries at injunction hear-
ings; and giving enjoined parties some preference in trial calendar to
decrease the length of effect of an improper injunction. Of course,
the necessity and importance of the bond increases with the lack of
certainty of the propriety of the injunction.
One reform could include an evidentiary hearing prior to the
Courts granting of an injunction or posting of a bond. 96 This pos-
sibility generally takes the form of moving injunction hearings to-
ward trials on the merits. 197 If a permanent injunction is proper
after a trial on the merits, and if an injunction bond is unnecessary
in the event of a permanent injunction, one must assume that justice
has been served, and that truth prevailed after a trial on the merits.
The possible limitations on this suggestion are inherent in our civil
justice system and not the result of the problems with injunction
bonds or injunctions.
196. Most courts include requests for injunction on a law and motion calendar regardless
of the scope of the injunction, the amount at controversy, the likely amount of a bond, or
other factors affecting the seriousness or nature of the requested injunction. In jurisdictions
involving requests for oral testimony at law and motion, sometimes a separate hearing will be
set.
197. Without discovery, a hearing on injunction cannot have the same evidentiary value
as a trial, but obviously as one moves along the spectrum from no evidence to substantial
evidence, the potential for error should decrease. See generally, 7 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, paragraph 65.09, at 65-95, (1986).
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The premise then is that there is less possibility for error. Sub-
sequently, the amount of an injunction bond is less important the
more an injunction hearing resembles a trial on the merits. Some
courts will allow oral testimony at an injunction hearing 198 while
others will not.1 99
An assumption can be made that oral testimony increases evi-
dentiary reliability due to factors such as the opportunity to cross-
examination, 2" and the ascertainment of truth or veracity by the
trier of fact."° ' Therefore, the greater the amount of oral testimony
allowed at injunction hearings, the more reliable the decision of
whether or not to issue an injunction. This places less importance
on the injunction bond.
Of course, injunction hearings are typically held on affidavits
or declarations. 2  Greater amounts of declaratory evidence sub-
mitted to, and considered by the court, would be another step to-
ward more complete evidentiary hearings at the setting of
injunctions. Oral testimony could assist in the actual determination
of the amount of an injunction bond203 in addition to the determina-
tion of whether or not an injunction is proper. As the certainty of
the propriety of an injunction increases, the importance of the
amount of bond decreases for the adjoined party. Nevertheless, if
an injunction is proper and the bond is too low, the plaintiff will be
ill-served. Therefore, absent complete certainty, a separate hearing
should be conducted concerning the amount of the bond.
Whether stated by statute or not, it is common knowledge that
injunction bonds are set based upon the possible damages suffered
by an enjoined party if wrongfully enjoined. z° In practice, courts
sometimes view potential injury to an enjoined party as being either
nominal, substantial, or extremely substantial. If damage to the en-
198. Santa Clara County Superior Court, for example, requires filing of a request for oral
testimony at a law and motion proceeding, which then may be granted or denied.
199. Federal courts in particular have rules that are peculiar to the judge drawn upon
filing. Generally oral testimony is requested at the time of the hearing. Some judges rou-
tinely grant such requests, others routinely deny them.
200. Cross examination would not be available if the hearing is conducted on affidavit or
verified complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
201. Veracity is easier to weigh due to the possibility of determination of truth from
conflicing afidavits.
202. Securities and Exch. Comm'n. v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D.C.
1975).
203. Injunction bond hearings, whether held separately from, or concurrently with, the
application for injunction, often involve questions of past product sales, prospective product
sales, market share, and other issues sufficiently complex to possibly warrant expert
testimony.
204. ABA Distribs., Inc., v. Adolph Coors Co., 505 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
1988]
44 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
joined party is seen as nominal, a bond will be set in a range of two
to ten thousand dollars. If damage to the enjoined party appears to
be substantial, a bond will be ordered in the fifty to two hundred
thousand dollar range. If potential injury to the enjoined party is
viewed as extremely substantial, a bond of $500,000 or more is
required.20 5
In business litigation where a party is enjoined from selling a
product, evidence, except that of the most cursory kind, is typically
not taken with regards to past sales of the product, dealer or distrib-
utor orders, inventory, potential future sales, market share, or antic-
ipation of market growth.20 6 This could obviously be deadly to the
company which had incurred millions of dollars in research and
development expenses in preparation to reach a multi-billion dollar
market, a not uncommon scenario for biotechnology firms. A com-
pany with a history of losses and no market share would have a
difficult time arguing that an extraordinarily high bond was
required.
Therefore, many possible avenues for reform could be proce-
dural ones.20 7 Obviously, the potential damage done by a prelimi-
nary injunction is much more significant than the potential damage
from a temporary restraining order.208 A temporary restraining or-
der is typically only in effect from ten to fifteen days. Regardless of
the speed at which technology is moving, ten to fifteen days should
not present the possibility of collapse of a given product.
This is not to imply, however, that damage cannot be done by a
ten day injunction of, for example, a game software company from
any shipments or sales which are ordered in the middle of a Christ-
205. As litigation surrounding high technology areas increases, courts are becoming
more comfortable with it. A few years ago, however, courts would not pay particular atten-
tion to the bond amount. Thus, a plaintiff would suggest a minimal amount, a defendant
would suggest the entire value of the company or product, and the court would order a bond
equal to the average of the two.
206. The catch 22 here is that many of these factors are held to be too speculative under
local jurisdiction remedies law to be recoverable. Thus, ignoring the injunction bond rule
problems for the moment, a company could be wiped out by an injunction and then the
owners faced with a proof problem of the prospective value of their company. Hence, no
recovery is awarded.
207. The "extended hearing" suggestion would not affect the substantive local injunction
bond statutes, the standards set forth in case law, or the guidelines for courts in setting bond
amounts.
208. Temporary Restraining Orders are in place from 10 to 15 days at the most, in most
jurisdictions. While a temporary restraining order can thus damage a company's sales of a
given product, the potential for damage is far less than an injunction pending resolution of
the dispute, possibly 3, 4, or more years.
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mas rush.2" 9 Nonetheless, except in a one product company, the
effect of a temporary restraining order is blunted somewhat by the
fact that it will usually only apply to one product or a fairly specific
technology. 210 The comparative harm by a preliminary injunction
is much more substantial.2 1
In an era where it typically takes three to five years to bring a
case to trial,21 2 a three to five year preliminary injunction will likely
result in the death of a high technology product.2" 3 Therefore, at
least at the preliminary injunction stage, jurisdiction of preliminary
injunction hearings should be moved from a law and motion calen-
dar, to a master or trial calendar. A threshold test as to the effect of
grant or denial of an injunction to plaintiff or defendant could be
adopted to avoid undue burden on the judicial system.
Of course, the importance of the grant or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction, however, cannot be greater than a motion for sum-
mary judgment. In fact, summary judgments may hold more
import for a party litigant than an injunction, unless the only relief
prayed for is injunctive relief. This begs the question of whether
summary judgment hearings should be moved from the law and
motion calendar to a "short-cause" calendar as well. This sugges-
tion is sure to elicit wrath from the bench due to already over-
crowded court conditions. It is, however, a workable means of en-
suring justice and equity in the granting of injunctions and the set-
ting of injunction bonds.21 4
Another suggestion for reform would be to require a separate
injunction bond hearing after an injunction has been granted.2 15
209. One significant problem, even with vacated temporary restraining orders, is the
market effect that adverse publicity may have. Products can be hurt by a short injunction if
the market becomes uncertain of the products future.
210. This is true, though many high technology companies are driven by a single
product.
211. See Price v. Block 535 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. N.C. 1982).
212. In Los Angeles County, for example, the five year statute set forth in CAL. CODE
CIV. PRO. § 583.310 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987) is frequently encountered.
213. Technologies are not made obsolete overnight, and many currently available prod-
ucts were first introduced in related form years ago, but continuous small improvements are
necessary. It would be unwise for a company to keep devoting resources to improving a
product which had already been enjoined, especially if the litigation was protracted. The end
result could very possibly include a permanent injunction. Of course, in some infringement
cases, the offending technology or element may possibly be purged from the product or
company.
214. In fact, some courts do advise extended hearings for complex injunction requests.
Additionally, FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) provides for the consolidation of a trial on the merits
with a preliminary injunction request.
215. Many courts follow this path already, some requesting special briefing on the bond
issue.
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This eliminates the need for judicial attention to the injunction
bond issue unless the injunction is granted. It will also ensure
proper briefing by the parties and the preparation of evidentiary ma-
terial related to the amount of a particular bond.2 16 The author has
found that many attorneys do not include significant briefing on the
issue of a bond at the injunction hearing. Rather, applicants merely
request the posting of a bond, and suggest an amount.
A separate hearing on injunction bond will provide the en-
joined party a chance to educate a court as to potential damage
their company may suffer, allow for additional evidence, and focus
the courts attention as to the bond amount. This may ensure com-
panies an adequate remedy under the injunction bond rule if they
are wrongfully enjoined.
A final suggestion for reform is to provide a mechanism either
by statute or by common law, whereby a potentially enjoined party
can point out the significantly increased possibility of harm due to
the product being enjoined. Thereby, the high technology company
which does not anticipate a significant window of opportunity for
commercial exploitation could point out the effect of the injunction
on that company, thereby invoking an increased evidentiary hearing
or separate hearing on the undertaking issue.217
This issue appears to be addressed from a different perspective
at the stage of determining whether or not the injunction should
issue. One factor typically considered by a court faced with a re-
quest for an injunction, is a balancing of the equities, whether harm
to the applicant by denial is greater than harm to the defendant.218
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice delayed is justice denied, and in the case of high tech-
nology, where the only certainty is change, this has never been more
true. When the high technology company finds a major product
has been enjoined, a major product which will be technologically
216. This proposal could even include expedited discovery; first on the issue of the in-
junction itself; and second on the issue of the bond. If oral testimony will not be allowed,
deposition testimony on the relevant issues could be admitted. Kelly v. Gilbert, 437 F. Supp.
201 (E.D.Mont. 1977).
217. There could be a threshold issue which would have to be met prior to directing
significant court attention to this issue. There could also be inclusion in the factors consid-
ered by courts in setting bond amounts, an additional element regarding the period of com-
mercial availability of the enjoined product.
218. Weyenberg v. Town of Menasha, 401 F. Supp. 801, stay ext. 409 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.
Wis. 1975).
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superseded or matched in a short period of time, it is often true that
the company itself will go down with the product.
Since an entire company can potentially be destroyed by an
injunction, a rule which limits the recovery for a wrongfully en-
joined party to the amount of a bond, is archaic. Hence the need for
reform and the suggestions that grant or denial of injunctions be
conducted at hearings with greater certainty, and that bond require-
ments be determined at evidentiary hearings or that the bond issue
be a matter of a timely separate hearing and briefing.

